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This thesis examines Soviet ethnic and national crobiems
resulting from the gradual demographic shifts presently
underway. It considers the impact of the shirt from a
Russian majority in a Russian dominated society, to the
Russians becoming only one large minority group among many.
The tensions that will increasingly strain the Soviet system
as a result of the aemographic changes and the complex
problems with which the new Kremlin leadership must deal Are
discussed in relation to Soviet foreign policy. A major
problem of the coming decades will be how the leadership
attempts to resolve these changes. The nationality problems
of the Soviet Union may not intrinsically be momentous, but
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I . INTRODUCTION
The USSR is a mul t i -ethni c , multi-national society,
consisting of over 100 distinct ethnic and linguistic
groups. Claiming that any "nationalities" problem has been
solved, the Soviet Union "o-f-Fers itself as a model for
multi-ethnic societies of the developing worlc."
CRef. 1: p. 13 Contrary to this view, this thesis will
examine Soviet domestic ethnic problems and the challenge of
a growing imbalance in the demographic structure of the
Soviet Union. In doing so, the impact of ethnic nationalism
and the demographic shifts on Soviet foreign policy will be
considered. If Soviet international behavior is constrained
by its domestic system, which may in turn be influenced by
the national character of the USSR, then the potential
impact of ethnic problems on Soviet foreign policy must be
considered.
Soviet foreign policy is the result o-f a complicated
mixture of diverse and freguently contradictory elements.
Any study of Soviet foreign policy is hampered by the
tradition a-^ Russian xenophobia and general suspiciousness
of the West. Secrecy is inherent in Soviet decisionmaking.
"There has been little (public Soviet) effort even to
explain and analyze ex post facto political situations and
Soviet responses in factual terms..." CRef. 2: p. 21 Much

o-f Western writing about influences on Soviet -foreign poucy
decisionmaking is mere speculation. Though many careful
analyses exist, these ar& limited by an outsider's
viewpoint. Though Soviet decisions are not formulated in a
vacuum, "the well-spring of Kremlin policy remains as much a
riddle as ever." CRef.3: p. 282J
These difficulties in analyzing Soviet foreign policy
tend to overshadow what can be deduced and even confirmed.
The Soviet capability to pursue a given course of action is
constrained by both external and internal factors. Because
the Soviet Union is part of an international community of
nations, the nature of the international system at any given
time must be considered as an input to Soviet foreign
policy. A further constraint comes from internal factors
such as geographic setting, military strength, economic base
and population. While Soviet control over external factors
may be minimal, Rosser notes that they have much "more
latitude in manipulating the internal factors affecting
their national capability". CRef. 4: p. 93 It must be
noted that no single factor can adequately explain Soviet
foreign policy. There is an i nterdependency among domestic
and foreign politics which, in turn, affects strategic
foreign policy. Gf this interplay, Soviet ethnic and
religious problems are only contributory factors.
One of the less studied internal factors affecting
Soviet national capabilities is their nationality problem,
a

an old— -f ashi oned term used in the Soviet Union for tne
phenomena o-f ethnicity. There is growing Western awareness
and understanding of Soviet mul t i -ethni ci ty s^nd its
implications. While there is some disagreement over its
potential severity, Western analysts have noted that Soviet
ethnic problems revolve around the unique status o-f the USSR
as "the world's last surviving nineteenth-century style
empire." CRef. 5: p. 1563 Or, as Richard Pipes notes, the
"Soviet Union today is in effect an empire run like a
nationally homogeneous state, suffering all the consequences
of this contradiction." CRef. 6: p. 53 This vast empire is
incredibly diverse, stretching across eleven time zones and
covering one—sixth of the earth's land mass, wich &n
extraordinary variety of languages, religions and ethnic
groups. While, at present, the Russians account for
slightly over half the country's population, minority groups
range from tens of millions to several thousands. Vet,
"Russians dominate the upper echelons of industry, the
government, the Party, and the military, scientific, and
educational establishments." CRef. 5: p. 1573
Today the Soviet Union is undergoing an historic and
profound shift in population dynamics. While demographic
changes take decades to become firmly established, the
gradually changing ratio of Russian majority to non-Russian
minority has been seen coming, and dreaded, tar years. This
thesis will examine some of the varied impacts of this

demographic shi-ft -tram majority to minority, particularly in
the areas of emergent nationality problems and their impact
on Soviet -foreign policy.
The Soviet national question has been the -focus of
interest since the October revolution. Its changing
character over the past six decades will be discussed
below. However, as a national problem it can be seen on two
levels. The first level is the discrimination against
national languages, cultures and religious groups, while the
second level comprises the Russian domination of cultural
and political life in the Soviet Union. Ironically, trie
result o-f years of ethnically related policies has been to
reinforce and perpetuate ethnic minorities. This
phenomenon, combined with the demographic shifts favoring
certain minority groups, particularly the non-European
Central Asian peoples, has markedly increased the number of
controversial questions/problems with which the Soviet
leadership must deal. These will have some ai-fect on almost
every aspect of Soviet life—military, economic and
pol i tical
.
It may be, however, that Soviet ethnicity is only one
aspect of the strident pol i tici zation o-f ethnic identity
sweeping across the globe. Ethnonati onai i sm , or politicized
ethnicity, is an area of increasing interest to scholars.
Meivin Groan argues that ethnonati onal ism "has become a
crucial factor in the domestic affairs of multi-ethnic
10

societies and a major disruptive -Force in contemporary
international relations." CRef. 7: p. 713 This idea wi 1 1
be considered throughout the thesis. Nationalism and the
impact of ethnicity on the USSR today is far mor^ than cne
sum of its parts. The difficulty of working with the






The Soviets are heirs to an empire built by Russian
czars; even a-fter sixty—seven years, this empire remains not
only relatively intact in terms of territory but also has
been enlarged. This imperial aspect underlies much of the
contemporary nationality problem. Many of the numerous
subject nations and areas o-f Czarist Russia were once
independent countries and most of them had strong cultural
and religious traditions. As a result Czarist Russia was
rarely seen as an integrated whole, and it was generally
governed by administrative measures rather than through
general laws. CRef. 8: p. 43 With so many diverse
elements, an overlap between domestic and foreign affairs
was unavoidable. Writing on the imperial dimensions of the
Czarist government, S.Starr notes that a "prime reason for
this interpenetration of imperial and foreign policies was
in the fact that often political and ethnic boundaries do
not coincide." CRef. 8: p. 63
This heritage causes, in part, the inherent difficulties
in domestic politics. Are policies to be applied only to
specific geographic regions, as apposed to a single law
throughout the empire? The Russians, like their Soviet
heirs, were dealing with Europeans and non-Europeans, forest
12

and stsppe -folk, northerners and southerners. Christians ana
Muslims, nomads, city dwellers and peasants. Nationality
for each region o-f the empire was -frequently a matter
social class. Landowners and rulers were often Russian .or
Slavic); the middle class, what there was of it, was largely
Jewish (especially in the Western part of Russia), while the
peasants were nationals.
B. YEARS OF REVOLUTION
In her comprehensive work on the decline of the Soviet
empire, Helene Ca.rrere d Encausse argues that at "the start
of the twentieth century the empire was already showing
signs of weakness; all its subject peoples were beginning to
resent its domination and looking for ways to escape from
it." CRef. 9: p. 133 Lenin opened the "prison of the
peoples" by appealing to and exploiting the various
nationalities' desire for freedom, ''Oppressed peoples, rise
up!" The Czar's empire, already badly damaged by World <M&r
I, collapsed under the combined forces of revolution, war
losses and nationalism. Several national communities,
including Armenians, Georgians and Ukrainians, broke away
during the course of the revolution and declared their
independence. However, as Meyer notes "in the name of
proletarian unity, the new Red Army reconquered most of the
breakaway nations." CRef. 5: p. 1561 This was in spite of
initial promises of political self-determination, evidence

of Soviet contempt -for those promises. A Library of
Congress report, strongly biased towards tne U.S., argues
that ^Soviet attitudes toward the national question have
been based solely upon political expediency w: nh a
short-range objective of establishing uncontested authority
o-f the centralized Soviet State and ultimately of merging
the nationalities into a single unit of Soviet power based
on Russian communist norms." CRef. 10: p. 20j
Having painfully established his rule, Lenin made a
number of decisions regarding the nationalities prcblem. He
believed that in the long run communism would win over
nationalism, disagreeing with many of his fellow Bolsheviks,
including Stalin. To Lenin, the fundamental aitn of socialism
was "not only to abolish the division of mankind into small
states and to remove all national isolation, not only to
bring nations closer together, but also to merge them."
CRef. 10: p. 20J Yet, Lenin argued that the state should
"not permit the overriding of any one nationality by
another." CRef. 10: p. 1603 Education was seen as the
means to the new Soviet Man—a multinational species—so
literacy in native tongues was endorsed. Meyer concludes
that "Lenin miscalculated. His policy did not lead to a
Soviet Man; instead, it triggered a renaissance of national
cultures throughout the Soviet Union." CRef. 5: p. 1563
Nathan Glazer, quoted by M. Croan, makes the point that
"successive generations of Soviet communist leaders have
14

suffered from the very same distorted view, i.e., an
underestimation o-f the appeal of nationalism."
CRef. 7: p. 74 3 This is why, over the long run, a nation of
Soviet Men has tailed to appear.
C. POST-REVOLUTION CONSOLIDATION
The post-revolution goal was to trans-form a
heterogeneous group of nations into a viable, governable
state. Treaties were signed among the Soviet republics
which established close economic and military ties, but in
essence resulted in Russia becoming "'primus inter pares".
Stalin became the expert on the nationalities problems. He
proposed a Soviet federation modeled on the RSFSR (Federated
Republic of Russia) which Carrere comments was
"characterized by a high degree of centralization and 3in
almost total lack o-f- local jurisdictional authority."
CRef. 9: p. 193
The result was the creation of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics as a federation of fifteen nominally
independent units (Soviet Socialist Republics or SSR's),
each officially the homeland of one of the largest
nationalities. "Smaller ethnic groups, and some or the
larger groups with homelands in their interior (where even
nominal independence would be an obvious fiction), a.re
represented by the next—lower level nationality-based unit
in the political-administrative hierarchy, the Autonomous
15

Soviet Socialist Republics (or ASSR's)." CRef. 1 p. 41
There are even smaller divisions, "Autonomous Ob lasts" and
"National Okrugs" for some of the smallest nationalities.
According to Ralph Clem, "egalitarian ideology was affirmed
by constitutional law." CRef. 11: p. 243 Soviet internal
organisation reflects the immense and complex ethnic
diversity of that country.
By the 1930 's, the USSR was plunged deeply into the
changes c&us&d by the purges, collectivization, and Stalin's
goal of eradicating national peculiarities. Stalin's power
base was the lower echelon Russian party members who were
adamantly pro—Russian and would not tolerate concessions to
aliens (i.e., non-Russians). World bi&r II somewhat altered
this perspective. "The war years seemed to re—create
nationalistic tensions like those which had led to the
break-up of the Empire, despite nearly a quarter century's
socialist training and federalism." CRef. 9: p. 391 Stalin
drew several lessons from the war. One, in particular, was
the vulnerability of the borderlands. In a country of
"exacerbated nationalisms he would completely renounce
pre-war egal i tar i anism, establish levels of priority for
local national sentiments, and raise the Russian nation to
the top rank, exalting its traditions and culture."
CRef. 9: p. 33J
16

D. CONTEMPORARY SOVIET UNION
Territorially, the Soviet Union is the aggregate of its
Czarist precedents, Leninist idealism about nation-states,
military strategy tor buffer zones, and the expedients of
economy necessary to build the Soviet society. These
combined to form an ethnic-geographic mosaic with the
dominant Russians a salient feature relative to the outlying
non-Russians. As a rule, non—Russians live in a great ar<z
stretching from the Baltic Sea through Eastern Europe,
across the northern parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia
into Siberia. This is virtually an uninterrupted,
non—Russi an—ma jori ty populated, peripheral borderland with
obvious strategic and geopolitical implications.
The central ity of Russia is offset by the spatial
distribution and concentration of the various nationalities
in their respective homelands. The majority of most Soviet
ethnic groups still live in their homelands or in contiguous
regions. In an article focusing on the national proble.it,
Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone comments that the "Russians ars
the most significant exception, and the eastward shift of
the Soviet population since 1917 occurred largely because of
the geographic mobility of the Russian groups who now
dominate the urban and industrial centers throughout the
country." CRef. 12: p. 763
A basic assumption underlying the Soviet approach to




resolution was, and could have been, reached only through
socialism. "All that now remains is the refinement of the
solution by assisting and manipulating those internal -forces
that will bring about -further rapproachment of nations and
ultimately fusion." CRef. 10: p. 363 This is the logical
result of Stalin's goal of a common culture with a "common
form and content", that is, communism fusing all the diverse
peoples of the USSR. Complete national unity continues to be
a viable goal. Such key words as "consolidation",
"association", "friendship", "drawing together", and
"complete unity" are mere variation of the common culture of
communism to be shared by all Soviets.
A qualification must be recorded. Many believe that the
centralised nature o-f the communist regime leaves little or
no autonomy in the various republics. No matter why the
federal ethnoterr i torial state structure was established, it
is nonetheless a part of the Soviet system. Clem notes that
the various ethnic groups "(1) see the -federal structure as
long term if not permanent; (2) assign importance to it; (3)
will resist attempts to downgrade it; and, (4) are now
making demands on the regime through the formal
ethnoterri torial medium." CRef. 11: p. 13D Ethnicity is a
base for interest group demands on both the the party and
the state. According to Rakowska-Harmstone, "in the absence
of institutionalised channels for interest articulation, the
republics are the focus for the aggregation of local
18

interests in ail spheres of social life; when articulated
local spokesmen, these invariably acquire ethr li c
overtones." CRef. 12: p. 313 One aim a-f ethnic
self-assertion is to gain the maximum autonomy which
constitutionally belongs to the republics.
19

III. POPULATION STATISTICS AND A BRIEF DEMOGRAPHIC
STUDY OF CONTEMPORARY SOVIET UNION
A. INTRODUCTION
One of the most -fascinating and potentially explosive
aspects o-f Soviet demographic behavior is the wide variation
in growth rates of ethnic groups. Here the future contrasts
sharply with the past. The Russians have long been tne
dominant nationality both politically and in sheer numbers.
Yet, a growing imbalance between European and nan—European
elements of the population may hAve long term effects. At
the Twenty-fifth Congress ai the CPSU, Brezhnev commented
that "Problems of the environment and of population, which
have grown more acute of late, must not escape the attention
of Soviet scholars." CRef. 13: p. 54 3, One such Soviet
scholar wrote that "in the contemporary world, population
problems, which have a significant influence on the rates of
socioeconomic development of various countries are
increasingly attracting the attention of the world pu.Dlic."
CRef. 13: p. 54 3
Broadly speaking, the nationalities of the European USSR
(the Baltic peoples, the Bel orussi ans, the Ukrainians,
and—most importantly—the Russians) Are characterized by
low rates of growth. The ethnic groups of Central Asia
(Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, Kirgiz, Turkmens, and Kazakhs) and
certain ethnic groups of the Caucasus regions Are
increasing in numbers at a phenomenal rate. Most of the
nationalities of the Volga-Urals AreA (Komi, Udmurts,
Chuvash, Mordvinians, Tatars, and Bashkins) and two of the
largest Caucasian groups (Armenians and Georgians) Are
intermediate in population growth rates.
CRef. 11: p. 143
20

A special problem encountered in researching Soviet
demography is the wide variance among the sources in the
terminology o-f Soviet peoples. The references range from a
European—non—European dichotomy, to Slavic and non-Slavic,
Central Asians and by implication, everyone eise. For this
thesis, the European—non—European distinction has been
chosen except when a specific group is re-f erred to, or in
direct quotes. European includes the nationalities ar the
European USSR noted above, while non—European encompasses
the peoples of Central Asia. Nationalities of the
Volga—Urals and Caucasus regions will be included only when
appropriate. The underlying assumption of most sources,
when writing of the demographic imbalances, is the growing
imbalance between the Russians and the Central Asians.
B. CENSUS RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS
The Soviet Union has conducted three censuses since
World War II—in 1959, 1970, and 1979. While much data was
officially published by the USSR on the first two, only
scanty information has been forthcoming on the 1979 census,
leaving a very incomplete picture. However, from all
available sources, Murray Feshbach, a noted U.S. demographer
specializing in the Soviet Union, has drawn four conclusions
which will be discussed in more detail below. The first is
that there is a striking difference in the rates of
population growth among the different national groups.

Second, there is a marked -failure of the Soviet male
population . (particularly in the Slavic regions) to regain
its demographi cal 1 y normal post—war share of the
population. Third, there is an uneven geographic
distribution of the youngest (0-9 years) members of the
population. And, fourth, the overall population is aging.
In the 1979 census Russians comprised about 52 percent
of the total Soviet population. By the year 2000 it is
projected that they will account for only about 47 percent
and many of them will be old. The growing Asian groups will
comprise over 20 percent of the population. "By the year
2000 about 40 percent of all persons turning iS in the
Soviet Union will be of Muslim origin." CRef. 14: p. 283
The first of Feshbach's conclusions was that there is a
growing di f f erenti al in the rates of population growth among
the various ethnic groups. The Soviet population is the
world's third largest, at over 270 million people, following
China and India. But its annual growth rate has dec! ined
from 1.8 percent a year in the 1950's to only 0. S percent in
1980. CRef. 15: p. 611 The tables at the end of this
chapter illustrate the population size, average annual
growth rates, and percentage of total Soviet population for
most of the major Soviet nationality groups. These figures
on rates of growth reflect natural increase (the excess of
live births over deaths), assimilation and migration. It
should be noted that some persons call themselves Russian
22

far census and passport purposes when normally they would be
considered members o-f another group, thus further skewing
the percentages. "Passing" as Russian can give non—Russians
certain advantages over registering as members u-f other
ethnic groups
-
In attempting to explain the wide disparity and
diversity in growth rates among the national groups, the
most likely explanations are found in the differential
trends of fertility and mortality. Among developing nations
fertility tends to be high — a population explosion caused
in part by better diet and medical care, and residual rural
pro—family values. In many respects the Central Asian
groups can be considered developing countries. The rural
Muslims have a low mortality rate while their fertility rate
ranges up to 5.3 births per woman. The Russian rate has
fallen below the 2.1 births per woman replacement level.
CRef. 15: p. 623 This lower population growth is typical of
modern industrial and urbanized societies.
Carrere comments that the "USSR having desperately
sought to become an industrial society, it comes as no
surprise that in interpreting modernization in terms of
urbanization and the rejection of rural life the Soviet
Union is losing the family values that country living had
succeeded in preserving for a time, and it pays the price
for this demographical 1 y . " CRef. 9: p. 843 Further, urban
living conditions strongly inhibit tendencies towards large

families. Crowded and sub-standard living condition-;, long
waits for apartments -for newlyweds caused by chronic reusing
shortages, poor day—care facilities + ar young children, and
difficulties in obtaining adequate food supplies, including
milk for children, combine to provide disincentives for
having large families.
In contrast, Muslims have remained an essential!/ rur^l
people. Most Muslim women do not work in industrialized
areas but on farms. Muslim young women envision large ideal
families, while their European counterparts frequently have
four or five abortions. CRef. 14: p. 233 Shevardnadze,
head of the Georgian Republic, recently revealed a serious
abortion problem in his republic at a meeting of top local
party, economic and scientific officials. At a minimum, the
number of official (i.e., registered) abortions exceeded the
number a-f births by 10,000 in one year. Shevardnadze
suggested that the actual gap may be even wider because of
the increasing practice of private, unregistered abortions.
CRef. 16: p. hi This suggestion is even more significant
when balanced against the abortion/live birth situation in
Georgia, which may perhaps be better than that of the USSR
as a whole.
Compounding the lower birth rates Are rising death
rates, about 10.3 deaths per 1000 people, higher than in the
1950s. The U.S. rate is S.S per 1000. Part of this is the
result of rising infant mortality (40 deaths per 1000 births
24

— triple the U.S. -figure) blamed on influenza epidemics,
contaminated baby formulas, and alcoholism among expectant
mothers. The alcoholism problem among the population as a
whole is also a major cause of premature death. This
increase in mortality in a nation at peace (excepting
Afghanistan, of course) is unique in modern developed
countries.
The problem of alcoholism leads to the second conclusion
drawn by Feshbach — that of a shortage of males in the
European areas. By 1979, for the most part, there should
have been a demographic recovery from the tremendous male
losses sustained in World war II- While the European areas
continue to indicate shortages, the Musi 1 m—non—European
areas are near normal distribution. Life expectancy has
dropped for European males and a major f avatar contributing
to this is alcoholism.
The death rates for males between 20 and 44 ha\><^
increased dramatically. In 1965 the life expectancy of a
Soviet male was 66 years, dropping to 64 by 1971, and a^n
estimated 62 today. The death rates for males of that age
group Are three to three and a half times as high as for
females in the same cohort. A major contributory factor is
alcoholism and its associated ravages of the human body,
including coronary disease. Feshbach notes a forthcoming
study by Vladimir Tremi , Alcohol in the USSR : A Statistical
Study that presents evidence of widespread poisoning from

defective alcohol, leading to at least 40,000 deaths in 1976
alone. These deaths were largely among adult males. In
1981 A. Volkov, the head o-f the Soviet Department of
Demography of the Central Statistical Administration
revealed that "...premature deaths of males exceeded
divorces as a reason why women became heads o-f households."
CRef. 17: p. 32 3
Vladimir Tremi, writing in Soviet Studies, noted that
the rate of death from alcohol poisoning reflects the state
of "a country's health and medical services and the general
socio-economic environment." CRef. IS: p. 4973 The
already high cost of alcohol was further raised bv 20
percent in 1981, probably forcing heavy drinkers to increase
their consumption of "samagon" or industrial alcohol ana
various surrogates, thus leading to more cases of
poisoning. Tremi reasoned that 'it is possible to imagine
that the authorities concluded that the alcoholics most
likely to succumb to alcohol poisoning.. .are already bevond
saving and nothing but a burden on society."
CRef. IS: p. 4993 An attitude of o-f-fiois.1 "benign neglect"
of the problem indicates Soviet disinterest.
The third conclusion was on the skewed distribution of
the population aged to 9 years. This distribution of live
births is perhaps the most significant, yet indirect,
evidence of the regional imbalances in population. While
most information on the Soviet census was gleaned from
26

Soviet general news media, Feshbach notes that "the need r o
resort to indirect calculations (on this distribution) stems
from a remarkable Soviet silence regarding such census
data." CRef. 17: p. Z2.1 In 197? the 0-9 years age cohorts
comprised about 14-16 percent o-f the Baltic and Slavic
populations, but an overwhelming 29-39 percent o+ the
population in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tadzhi kistan.
This indication of continued high -fertility in the Muslim
republics has long range significance. Godfrey Ba.1 dwin or
the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division of the U.S. Bureau
of the Census has estimated that by the year 2000, "the
youngest cohorts of the six Muslim republics will total some
85 percent of the total for cohorts of the same 0—9 years of
age in the RSFSR. These youngsters in turn will be the
progenitors of the USSR's population in the next century, oi
the future labor force and military manpower in the USSR. 1 '
CRef. 17: p. 3Z1
The final demographic conclusion isolated by Feshbach
concerns the overall aging of the population. As with most
industrial societies, the average age of the population is
creeping upwards. In 1975 it was 28.7 years, and is
expected to reach 33.1 by the year 2000. This dramatically
increases the number of eligible pensioners (males o\/er 60
and females over 55), while further affecting the nation's
fertility potential. Where the birth rate has remained high
(in the Muslim areas) the percentage of old in the
27

population is actually dropping. An aging population so
affects the labor -force, with increasing numbers of the nev*
recruits coming from Muslim areas.
C. IMPACT AND RESPONSE
The Soviets ar& clearly aware of the problems they
face. How they handle them over the next decades mav have a
large impact on their stability as a nation dominated by
Russians. Of course, dealing with and projecting from
demographic data is a waffling proposition. Ca.r,~Bre
emphasizes this when she related the story of the great
Russian scientist Mendel yev who predicted in 1900 that by
2050 his country's population would stand at 300 million,
CRef. 9: p. 883 Mendel yev had based his prediction on the
fact that the population of Czarist Russia had doubled in
forty years.
Despite claims that their "nationality" problem has been
solved, recent Soviet actions have actually aggravated the
nationality question. Boris Mei ssner writes that
non—Russian nationalities have been adversely affected by
Soviet (i.e., Russian) policies in a number of ways. Though
the leaders speak of "internationalism" and a "single Soviet
people" they actually have intensified their policy or
Russi f icati on. Many schools of higher learning now are
"encouraged" to use Russian. Russian is given official
status as a second national language in Belorussia, Moldavia
and Kazakh. CRef. 19: p. 203
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Meissner comments that "Soviet policies have had
particularly adverse impact on those nationality groups not
settled on a compact territorial unit, such as the jews and
Germans." CRef. 19:: p. 203 Cultural autonomy tor these
groups is rejected on ideological grounds thus encouraging a
strong Jewish and German desire to emigrate. Another policy
that adversely affects the nationalities is the Soviet
policy of centralization, particularly economic
centralization. "In the 1977 Constitution of the USSR, the
economy of the USSR is referred to as a 'single national
economic complex which encompasses all sectors of social
production, distribution, and exchange' within the
country." CRef. 19: p. 203
The following sections will examine the potential impact
of the changing demographic balance on the USSR. Uneven
population growth has led to an irregular distribution of
available manpower across the Soviet Union. These
demographic trends Ars of major importance for all Soviets,
affecting not only the labor force and military, but placing
increasing demands on the system for education, housing and,
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IV. ETHNICITY IN THE USSR TODAY:
EMERGENT NATIONALITY PROBLEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Because of the dramatic decline in Slavic population
growth and the concomitant rise in growth among the Asian
Muslims, the drop in the number of Russians is bound to have
far—reaching , and perhaps deleterious, effects on the Soviet
Union. The non-European ethnic groups continue to erode the
Russian share of the total population, prompting Clem's
observation that "the Soviet leadership will need to decide
to what extent these nationalities should be further
integrated into the elite power structure, a decision
obviously fraught with serious implications."
CRef. 11: p. 14J
Concern over this growing disparity is reflected in
mounting official actions. In 1970 a special high—level
Scientific Council on Nationality Problems under the
Presidium of the Academy of Sciences was created to explore
the issues. CRef. 20: p. 3653 Several of the policies
designed to assuage the nascent crisis will be discussed
below. But little can change the figures of people already
born. By 2000 A.D. between 20 and 24 percent of the
country's total population and almost 40 percent of its
teenagers and young adults will be non-European.
CRef. 20: p. 365 1 The "deep—seated psychological and
political anxieties among members of the ruling elite"

CRef. 20: p. 365] aroused by the recognition of the
burgeoning Asian population is seen reflected in the epithet
yellowing applied to it. Azrael relates several jokes about
this anxiety including one that "when you scratch a Russian
you -find a Tatar." CRe-f. 20: p. 365J
There is growing disparity between the European and
non-European nationalities, not only in growth rates, but
manifested in economic dilemmas, military consequences,
political implications, and potential conflicts. These will
be discussed below. The problems of the nationalities have
an unique place in internal Soviet structural dynamics.
Clem argues that "ethnicity in the USSR has continued to be
a salient force, perhaps even the salient -force in Soviet
polity and society." CRef. 11: p. 153 This is underscored
by R. Pipes when he notes that the "Soviet Union in the only
major power where the dominant nationality barely has a
majority." CRef. 21: p. 11
B. ECONOMIC DILEMMAS
First to be considered &re the economic dilemmas
resulting from the growing demographic imbalances. Pipes
argues that perhaps "the most important single element which
keeps ethnic feelings alive in multinational states is
competition for resources and services." CRef. 21: p. 33
This must be particularly true of a nan—consumer oriented
country such as the USSR. The unequal distribution of goods
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and services serves as a catalyst to politicize ethnicity.
However, the -focus of this paper is on the problems caused
by ethnicity, here, in particular economic ones. These can
be viewed -First in the European areas and then in the
non—European areas of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union suffers from enormous de-formations (to
use Soviet o-f-ficial jargon) of capital and labor seen in a
classic north/south split. About 75 percent of the Soviet
industrial output is concentrated in the European north
where the labor pool is dwindling. The south, where the
working—age population is growing, remains relatively
undeveloped. "The Soviets either must devote enormous
capital resources to develop the south or move labor to the
industrial areas in the north, which would require a great
increase in capital expenditure on housing in that area."
CRef . 14: p. 233 Given the large portion of the gross
national product that goes to the military, and the
projected fall in Soviet economic growth rates, such an
increase could seriously affect an economy whose capital
resources are already strained and whose uneven population
growth has led to a very irregular distribution of available
manpower.
Andropov focused on domestic economic problems in his
first major policy statement after becoming Secretary
General. Though I am unaware ii these problems were
specifically addressed, any resolution attempts are certain
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to be costly and controversial. Yet, the declining European
workforce focuses attention on the possibility of a stagnant
economy. Azrael notes
What makes this prospect particularly unsettling is the
fact that the vast bulk of the increase in industrial
output that has occurred in the postwar Soviet Union is
attributable to increases in the European work force
rather than to increases in per capita labor productivity,
which has grown only moderately despite the regime's
frantic efforts to raise it. Even if it manages to
replenish its European work force—by reducing draft terms
and/or draft quotas, curtailing full—time secondary
schooling, or accelerating the already rapid flight of
young Europeans from the countryside—the only way the
regime can hope to staff the many new enterprises on which
it has staked so much of its prestige and credibility is
either to locate the bulk of them in Central Asia or to
mobilize large numbers of Central Asians for work in other
regions. Unfortunately for the regime, however, these
policies could exact a very heavy price.
CRef. 20: pp. 367-3632
As seen above, one solution usually proposed is the
increased utilization of non—Europeans into the
industrialized labor force. This yellowing of the national
economy is troubling to the Soviet leadership because, as a
rule, the Central Asians have "remained outside the
mainstream of the country's economic development and contain
a heavy preponderance of undereducated peasants with a
weak—to—nonex i stent knowledge of Russian and a tenacious
aversion to interregional or even intraregi onal migration."
CRef. 20: p. 367 3 The mobility of non—Europeans is severely
inhibited by their unf ami 1 i ari ty with Russian language and
cul ture.
The growing numbers of Central Asians will probably do
little voluntarily to alleviate labor shortages elsewhere in
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the Soviet Union as they are generally quite traditional and
homeland— 1 ovi ng. They have little inclination to abandon
rural ways o-f li-fe for cold water, shared bath/kitchen
facilities, ana miniscule apartments in some far-away,
lonely city where they would not even speak the language.
Even proposals to shift some of the industrial plants to
Central Asia have a number of drawbacks other than the cost
of relocation. First is the difficulty of transporting
industrial plants in a country as large as the USSR and as
lacking in modern transportation networks. Second, "it will
take years for Central Asians to develop the skills and
urban life—style necessary to staff big industrial
facilities." CRef. 5: p. 160! Also, much of the Soviet
Union's raw materials and markets are -far from Central Asia,
further compounding the transportation dilemma. Finally, as
Meyer notes, "Soviet Central Asia is too close to China. The
Russians are unwilling to install big industrial facilities
within range a-f Chinese weapons. And while no Soviet will
admit this publicly, there is apparently some fear that in a
Sino-Soviet war the people of the Central Asian Republics
might not be entirely clear about which side they want to
win." CRef. 5: p. 1601
Another aspect o-f Soviet ethnic problems directly
related to their economic difficulties is that of regional
development. Since World War II much official attention has
been given to how overall economic growth is to be
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distributed across the Soviet Union. In the almost Forty
/ears since the war, economic development has concentrated
key industries usually in European areas, largely to the
exclusion of the rest of the country. Development, or the
lack thereo-f , is increasingly becoming an ethnic issue
complicated, as noted above, by the location or raw
materials. Further, if "policy-makers involved in the
allocating o-f scarce investment funds were forced to choose
between an economically more feasible project on the one
hand and a less feasible project designed to oolsr.er a
lagging ethnoterri tory on the other, the choice in most
instances would no doubt have been the -former."
CRef. 11: p. 103 Yet, as long as significant disparities
exist in economic treatment of the various regions, some
resentment is bound to occur.
Russian ethnocentri sm also exacerbates this problem. In
response to the growing demands of non—Russian groups, a
powerful pro—Russian backlash has been triggered. Russians
are very mindful of their history, and feel that they Are
responsible for the greatness of the Soviet Union. Further,
they are extremely race-conscious "with a strong distaste
and even contempt for non-Slavs and especially non-whites."
CRef. 5: p. 1653 The population yellowing dismays them.
They strongly resent the need to divert money from Siberia,
which is viewed as the Soviet Union's future, to the
regional needs of border nations (for, of course, money
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cannot be diverted -from the military). "Russians seem
thoroughly outraged as they repeatedly discover that
Georgians and Armenians a^re 50 unpatriotic as to put their
own local interests be-fore those of the Soviet Union."
CRef. 5: p. 1653
C. MILITARY CONSEQUENCES
The military is demographi cal 1 y ordained to undergo a
yellowing process unless drastic measures ars taken by the
central authorities. This only compounds the other problems
currently -facing the Soviet military such as drug abuse,
rampant alcoholism, epidemics caused by poor living
conditions, crime and corruption. With the ethnic changes,
it is estimated that by the year 2000 about 40 percent o-f
all persons turning eighteen will be o-f Muslim origin. As
this cohort is the source o-f military draftees, the end
results will be growing difficulties in the coming years as
the military attempts to adjust to ever larger numbers of
Muslim conscripts.
Russians largely dominate the Soviet military. Nearly
all senior officers ^re Russian—the few exceptions being
non—Russian Slavs. Recruits Are segregated by ethnic groups
for both linguistic and political reasons. This is not to
indicate that they are segregated by specific ethnic group
to serve together, but that many non—Europeans usually serve
in construction units while most Europeans serve in such

high-priority units as the Strategic Rocket Force and the
armored corps. This may be based, in part, on the necessity
of speaking fluent Russian for assignment to high-priority
units. The non-European conscripts pose a threat to the
already weakened efficiency o-f the Soviet armed -forces.
"Non-Slavic minority draftees have demonstrated a
notoriously poor knowledge of Russian, which is the sole
language of communication in this most Russian of all Soviet
institutions." CRef. 15: p. 623
Further, non—European draftees generally do not hs.^e an
urban—or i ented education and thus take much longer to adjust
to an industrialized military. Some argue, notably William
Odom, that the demographic imbalance will not have a
significant impact on Soviet military manpower policy
because "the trained reserve manpower pool is sufficiently
large -for baby booms and busts to be absorbed without a
noticeable effect on force levels or change in military
service policy." CRef. 22: pp. 13-143 He seems to have
missed the point of the long range implications of this
change.
Another analyst, Ellen Jones, argues that difficulties
with ethnic minorities may be less serious than the
disciplinary problems resulting from excessive hazing o-f new
conscripts, alcohol and drug abuse, and poor leadership in
non-prestigious units. CRef. 23: P. 2S5D She notes that
the Soviets rely on a mass army based on conscription. Its
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key roles include both providing military security to the
USSR and a number of economic and social nan—mi 1 i tary
services. Jones comments that the "militarv constitutes a
flexible source o-f labor to help ease regional labor
shortages." CRef. 24: p. 1073 Yet, as noted elsewhere in
this paper, manning the military has contributed, in part,
to such shortages.
Jones further describes how the military can exert a
positive influence on non-Russian soldiers by exposing large
numbers of them to an "integrated and concentrated political
socialization program in a highly regimented environment.
"
CRef. 24: p. 1083 Perhaps the Soviet intent is to dilute
nationalist loyalties and maximise political assimilation.
If such is the case, the European Soviets must maintain a
strong grip on the structure of the military and not allow
the gradually increasing numbers of non—Europeans to gain
dominance.
Historical parallels are tenuous and inexact. However,
various imperial armies of the past have been comprised of
both dominant and minority groups, with the latter gradually
increasing both in size and power. It would be interesting
to pursue am analogy between the Soviet army of 2000 with
the Roman army of A.D. 300.
Aggravating the problems of communication in a military
system, where many of the draftees do not speak the lingua
franca of Russian, is the potential for racial violence
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between the European and nan—European members or th-"?
military. Apparently some incidents have already occurred.
Generally the "undereducated Asians Are given menial jobs
such as kitchen work and manual labor, triggering strains
that frequently erupt in barracks brawls."
CRef. 25: pp. 25-26 J Yet , this must be tempered bv the
realization that much of this information comes from emigres
who may have biased viewpoints.
The Soviet Chief of Staff speaks openly about the
Russian-language deficiencies of the Central Asian recruits,
which is reflected, in part, by their military assignments.
"Young Moslems have been largely prevented from serving in
elite units—the Strategic Rocket Force, the Navy and the
Air Force. About 85 percent of ail these forces appear to be
made up of Slavs. To the degree Moslems Are assigned to
these farces they are in menial positions."
CRef. 14: P. 283 A Russian publication highlighted this
problem of draftees with poor knowledge of Russian,
commenting that their military units were solicitously
helping them "to overcome quickly the 'language barrier',
and to take a more active part in the life of the
collective, and to learn to operate modern military
technology more successfully." CRef. 26: p. 83
As the proportion of non—Europeans in the military grows
it will become almost impossible for the military to
continue "its present practice of assigning non-Slavs to low
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priority units and packing the high priority units wi
Slavs." CRef. 11: p. 1633 This will have enormous impact' on
the military's effectiveness in its traditional role o-f
suppressing internal (i.e., national) unrest.
Another major implication of the increasing numbers of
non—Europeans in the higher priority units is that the
unit's efficiency will be lessened. The non—Europeans may
be ineffective in combat because many do not speak or
understand Russian. This could result in severe command and
control problems. Most officers would be Europeans, usually
speaking only Russian, while a significant portion of the
rank and file will be Central Asians. These non—Europeans
will also reduce efficiency in the sense that many are not
as educated as their European counterparts, nor are they as
Sovietized with Soviet/Russian goals and loyalties.
Compounding this efficiency problem are the growing forces
of nationalism in the Soviet Union. As the growing
demographic changes force the central government to cope
with the military manpower problems, those difficulties that
presently seem non—threaten! ng will have a significant
impact on the efficiency o-f the Soviet military.
D. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS
The impact of demographic shifts will also be seen in
the Soviet political arena. Despite official claims that a
new Soviet people has emerged, much evidence exists to
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contradict this. Azrael presents several countervailing
examples. "Many members of the country's major diaspora
nationalities, including not only Jews but also the 'Volga
Germans, the Greeks, and the Meshkhetian Turks, ha^<5 become
so embittered at the continued denial of their communal
rights that they have renounced their Soviet citizenship and
have demanded to be repatriated to their quite foreign
homelands." CRef. 20: p. 376J Outspoken critics of Soviet
nationality policies and practices have appeared in nearly
all of the European areas. A number of national i stical ly
inspired acts of violence have occurred. Further, there
have been many organized protests against centrally imposed
curbs on national sel f—expression.
Membersnip in local ethnographic and historical
societies has grown dramatically. These seem to reflect the
nationalistic yearnings of their memoers. The final point
Azrael makes is that there "have been numerous cases in
which native Party and State officials, including two
republic Party First secretaries with seats in the
Politburo. ..have shown a certain laxity in combating the
forces of local nationalism and have pursued the parochial
interests of their fellow nationals at the expense of their
all-union responsibilities." CRef. 20: p. 3773
The Soviet political approach to nationalism has been
colored by their "divide et impera" policy. They tend to
deliberately exaggerate ethnic differences among the
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mi parities. Therefore, while there are over
identifiable ethnic groups within the Soviet Union, peri" aps
only a dozen or so are politically viable. These, according
to Pipes, include the -following groups: Ukrainians;
Beiorussians; Muslims (nearly all o-f whom Are Sunni and
Turkic in background): Georgians; Armenians; the Jews; the
three Baltic nationalities; East Asians; and, seme mixed
West European, most notably the Germans. CRef. 21: p. 21
Car rere tends to agree, but notes that the various
peoples o-f the Soviet Union can be considered in three
categories. The -first category is those members of small
national communities who aire growing weaker and being
assimilated, notably some Siberian groups. She identifies a
second group with a high degree of national consciousness,
but weak by circumstance, most particularly some of the
Baltic nations. The third group is comprised of the
ethnically conscious and demographical 1 y viable
nationalities of Central Asia and the Caucasus.
CRef. 9: p. 2671
Why does this nationalistic sentiment survive today?
Croan discusses the upsurge of ethnopol i ti cal loyalties
noting that they "not only mock prospects for a viable
international order... but also defy expectations, whether
Marxist or liberal, of the demise of ethnic identification
and a waning of nationalism..." CRef. 7: p. 711 Further,
the alternatives to their own nationalism for Soviet
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citizens are assimilation or Russi-f ication. Th<3 Sov
authorities continually stress the need to draw together ihe
various states, which is tantamount to Russi-f ication , and
anathema to many Soviets. Pipes concludes that the most
important element in prolonging and expanding nationalistic
feelings in the Soviet Union "is competition for resources
and services. This is true in e^-ery multinational society,
but is a particularly potent factor in the USSR where the
government enjoys a monopoly of national wealth and doles
out products and services no more than it must."
CRef. 21: p. 41
With the increases in education and communication it has
become increasingly difficult to isolate the masses from the
effects o-f nationalist sentiments. Most national areas not
only utilize their own language but teach and publish in
it. Further, all citizens must carry internal passports
which emphasize their nationality. "Nationality is
determined solely by parentage; place of birth or current
residence is irrelevant." CRef. 5: p. 1563
The final aspect of the potential political implications
of the Soviet demographic shift is seen in the growing
tendency among Russians to assert their nationality-
Russians are very race and history conscious. Because of
the unitary format of the CPSU, the Russians are a ruling
oligarchy dominating the USSR. As their population starts to
decline they will become one ethnic group among many—though
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a very large one. At present, the Russians populate n at
the big cities, run the government, staff tne top ranks of
the party, man the technical and combat -formations o* tne
military and work the industries. with the loss or their
majority status, some authorities see the Russians •sis-rr&rinq
psychological distress over decisions on how to best deal
with the situation. In 1975 Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that
"the national question. . .could prove itsel-f to be the + atal
contradiction o-f Soviet political evolution."
CRe-f. 5: p. 1653
E. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
A Soviet writer, whose work on demography was published
by Fravda Publishers, notes that population "policy is
unquestionably within the national competence of sovereign
countries." CRef. 27: p. 833 He distinguishes between
demographic policy and population policy in general
.
Demographic policy is confined to direct state influences on
people while population policy "tries to influence the
socio-economic conditions of reproduction of the population
in their entire aggregate, including its higher literacy and
cultural level of the change in the life style and the role
of women in society." CRef. 27: p. 993 The goal of Soviet
population policy is to encourage optimal reproduction of
the population as a whole and to specifically encourage
particular repuplics. Such policy must be long term because
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o-f demographic inertia, yet timely, in order to prevent
demographic problems -from becoming irresolvable.
The Soviets have put -forward a number o-f possible
solutions to their nationality problems, though none are as
drastic as those reached by the Chinese in attempting to
resolve Chinese population problems, such as their strident
encouragement of one child per family. Many of these
revolve around trying to convince European women to increase
the sizes of their families—the so—called pro—natal ist
policies. In 1974 the Government announced "that women who
give birth to ten or more children, in addition to getting
the traditional mother—heroi ne designation, would henceforth
be eligible for a Glory of Motherhood order and a Motherhood
Medal." CRef. 5: p. 164J It would seem that these awards
will go mostly to Muslim mothers. Official Soviet concern
and resulting policies have been due largely to the
proddings of concerned Soviet demographers. Gradually, the
leaders Are being -forced to acknowledge that something must
be done to reverse the decline of the Soviet (read Russian)
f ami 1 y
.
At the Twenty—fifth Party Congress, Brezhnev apparently
called for a "more effective population policy" to include
uniform policies on family size, maternity and child cars
allowances, and working conditions for women. No uniform
policies were adopted because of the high costs predicted.
However, a more differentiated policy concentrating on
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specific regions and groups has resulted. Some policies
involve regionally differentiated timetables for maternity
leave, rises in birth grants and boosts in child allowances,
even to unwed mothers. However, these incentives ars too
limited to overcome the disincentives of crowded living
conditions and the superwoman , working woman syndrome.
Urban Soviet mothers and wives are expected to not only work
at full time jobs, but provide all the amenities of
homelife. This frequently means standing long hours in
lines for necessities for the home. Soviet men generally do
not help in the home.
An article intriguingly entitled, "Help for Singles in
the USSR" gave a number of rather intimate examples of the
skewed demographic situation and attempts to resolve it.
For example, "Grey—eyed blond woman wishes to become
acquainted with a serious, non-drinking, intellectual man,
between the age of fifty—six and sixty." CRef. 28: p. 71
Similar such ads have appeared throughout the Soviet Union
in various newspapers highlighting the sexual imbalance.
Another instance of official concern over the low European
birthrate was seen in a district of Moscow where young
people were bombarded with pro-family information during
"Soviet Family Week". This was done in the hopes of
convincing them that State recognition of large families had





There are other alternatives to home production q*
workers. It is possible that the Soviet Union may be -forced
to recruit numbers of -foreign workers to fill labor
deficits. This has been done in the past and is a time
honored practice. Many Germans came to Russia to work for
the Czars. Some Vietnamese may have helped work on the
pipelines. Azrael notes that large numbers of Chinese were
used during the 1 950 ' s , while some East European and
Scandinavian workers are being used on special projects
today. CRe-f. 20: p. 369 3
In December 1 Q30 the Supreme Soviet adopted a new law on
military obligations. According to this new decree all
males are liable -for military service at age eighteen.
Reporting on this development, Lev Yodovich explains that
the only de-ferments available will be -for those who have
enrolled in institutes of higher education offering
"training of interest to the Ministry o-f Defence".
CRef. 29: p. 71 This will result in an additional
700,000-800,000 recruits each year beginning in 1983. The
government has also increased military training in civilian
institutes, and is pushing the slogan, "Today's students are
tomorrow's officers." CRef. 29: p. 73
Traditionally, officers have been trained in military
academies. But increasingly, the Soviets are turning to an
"R0TC" program in their civilian institutes, thus creating
"true centres of military-patriotic work" according to the
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Ministry of Defense. CRef. 29: p> 61 Students compieti
the course work are given junior officer rank and c=».p be
called up depending on the military's need -for their
services. Predictably, this drain away from the civilian
economy further increases its skilled worker labor shortage
and undermines the economy.
F. FOTENTIAL CONFLICTS
The growing disparity in growth rates among the various
Soviet republics has caused official concern and reaction;
yet, generally there do not seem to be any long range
solutions. The potential for conflict among the varying
nationalities will probably grow and is very likely to
center on consumer problems. Particularly sensitive issues
will be access to jobs, housing and schooling. If Americans
think it difficult to operate in English with all our
minority groups, how would we deal with a plethora of
official secondary languages?
At present, systemic constraints have prevented, for the
most part, any open expression of the desire for
separation. These constraints further restrict overt ethnic
competition. Yet, throughout the Soviet Union as
Rakowska-Harmstone writes, "the whole fabric of Soviet
society is permeated, subtly, but unmistakably, by ethnic
antagonisms and competition..." CRef. 12: p. 753 Ethnic
sel f—assertion aims at maximizing national autonomy and has
a goal of gaining as much sel f—determi nation as possible.
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It has been argued that as the nationalities tend to
push for their rights, and even as they just become more
evident in the Soviet Union, the government will be a mora
unyielding to any demands made. "The Kremlin may have no
choice but to adopt a hard—line response to nationalist
pressure if it wants to keep centrifugal forces from tearing
the Soviet Union apart." CRef. 5: p. 1663 As a result,
internal repression is likely to grow worse.
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IMPACT OF EMERGENT NATIONALITY PROBLEMS
ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
A. INTRODUCTION
Soviet foreign policy is the result c-f a highly
developed bureaucratic political system which is resistant
to change and rigid with conservatism. Decisionmaking is
quite politicized with the Politburo and more specifically,
the Central Committee, at the center o-f the process. Far
any given foreign policy issue, the leadership considers
both the possible international consequences and the
potential impact on domestic politics. Domestic political
constraints became particularly important under Brezhnev's
leadership and continued to be key issues under Andropov the
(za.reteiker . It is -far too early to know what direction
Chernenko will take, or what his stands Are on specific
issues. Since the Soviet Union is essentially a collective
leadership, with fluid coalitions or blocs, creating
consensus for policy formation is the key to power
consol idation.
Soviet foreign policy is generally based on a series of
key images of national security. Above all, the Soviet
Union wants to survive both as a state and as a world
superpower. The Soviet Union wants to avoid nuclear
confrontation with the U.S., while maintaining or surpassing
military parity. Mindful of past experiences, the Soviets
see the Eastern European buffer states as vital to Soviet
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security. They are determined to prevent the rise o-f an
equal or superior power in Europe, while China pos^s a
distinct challenge both as an Asian (and eventually global)
military power and rival leader -for the international
communist movement. They seek to lessen U.S. commitments
both to NATO and Japan, while protesting U.S. involvement in
Third World endeavors. If possible, the Soviets seek to
utilize potential Third World opportunities, which
underscores a Soviet dilemma—the need for more allies and
the inability to afford them all.
From this overview, speci-fic Soviet foreign policy
priorities can be drawn from Article Twenty-eight of the
Soviet Constitution. Using Soviet rhetoric and vernacuil ar
,
these include:
1. Securing favorable international conditions for the
construction of Communism in the USSR;
2. Strengthening the position of world socialism;
3. Supporting the struggle of national liberation and
social progress;
4. Preventing wars of aggression;
5. Achieving general and complete disarmament; and.
6. Consistently implementing the principle of peaceful
coexistence between states of differing social
orders. CRef. 30: p. 170 3
From these goals several conclusions can be drawn. First,
one of the most important tasks of Soviet foreign policy is
to protect the power position of the Soviet leadership and,
in doing so, protect their various domestic programs and
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goals. Effective -foreign policy must also strengtnen. and
perhaps increase Soviet hegemonic control. To do so, the
Soviets use a wide range o-f tools to implement their foreign
pol icy.
Of various aspects of Soviet government, foreign policy
is probably one of the least susceptible to direct influence
and/or involvement by members of the population.
"Izvestia's" political observer, Aleksandr Bavin, told a
Swedish interviewer that
...while the political decisionmaking process in the west
takes place as though at a circus before the eyes of a
colossal number of spectators, we have a different
tradition. Our decisionmaking processes run their course
without too much publicity. It is important that the
people taking part in the decisionmaking process retain
maximum objectivity in their evaluation of the actual
issues. Pressure from public opinion could make their
approach to the problems more difficult when decisions e<rs
made in public. That is why we think that, at the present
stage of development at least, it is better for these
problems to be handled with as little public access as
possible... CRef. 31: p. 71
Michael Rywkin, writing on Soviet Central Asia and the
state, argues that the "reluctance to take into
consideration the possible impact of non—Russian groups
within the USSR on the conduct oi Soviet foreign policy
comes from the general impression that public opinion has
little bearing on Soviet decision-making, and ethnic opinion
least of all, with the obvious exception of Russian
nationalist feelings." CRef. 32: p. 643 He concludes that
Moscow is not insensitive to public opinion, citing diverse
examples ranging from the tolerance of Georgian nationalism,
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and pro-Arab Soviet policies being influenced by a desire to
please Soviet Muslim states.
However, foreign affairs "inevitably require, in
Communist as in other polities, great reliance on
authoritative institutions." CRef. ZZ: p. 383 The
secreti veness o-f central policy development further
complicates input from a multiplicity o-f sources and is
conducted completely out of the public domain. Any
perception and analysis of Soviet foreign policy is always
hypothetical and even speculative. CRef. 34: p. 33
Throughout the 1970 s, the USSR was on a foreign policy
offensive, backed by a steady military buildup. Odom notes
that Brezhnev "combined foreign policy mobilism with
domestic policy immobilism. CRef. 22: p. 53 The leaders of
the 1980 s will have to -facze the economic entropy, massive
corruption and domestic stagnation that Brezhnev left as a
legacy.
Soviet foreign policy is a result of a mix of
capabilities and opportunities. Yet, a crucial determinant
will be the Soviet domestic context. The European decline
in birthrate contrasted with the non-European growth,
coupled with rising societal expectations led Alvin
Rubinstein to conclude that this "may intensify discord
among nationality groups. Some Western experts believe this
to be the tinder that could cause the regime much trouble."
CRef. 3: p. 2853
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How Brezhnev's legacy will affect Soviet -foreign policy
decisions will be -further tempered by the role a-f ethnicity
in Soviet -foreign policy. However, it is difficult to
specifically link demographic trends to Soviet foreign
policy. Yet, ethnic concerns may help shape, or even
create, a context that affects the various alternatives
available to decisionmakers. A Soviet writer, Arab-ugly,
claims that "demographic problems exert a growing influence
both on the internal policies of individual countries and on
international relations in general." CRef. 27: p. 801 He
further argues that because all global problems are
interconnected, solution of any one indirectly determines
the success with others.
Carrere notes that since Khrushchev "responded to his
growing domestic difficulties by seeking legitimacy through
foreign a-f fairs" the Soviet Union has believed that
achievement of both political and military parity with the
U.S. is based in part on "elimination of Soviet economic
difficulties and technological backwardness."
CRef. 9:' p. 553 Using the breakdowns of Guns versus Butter,
Power, The Military, and Exports, the following paragraphs
will briefly examine the impact of emergent Soviet
nationality problems on their foreign policy.
B. GUNS VERSUS BUTTER
Much attention has been paid recently to the growing
consumer discontent in the Soviet Union. Economic entropy
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has been underscored by the growing second economy and
widespread corruption. With the military/industrial complex
highly -favored over consumer oriented production, there are
dramatic short-falls in meeting consumer demands, Some o-f
the local regions are pressing for more economic
self-determination. "Simply put, local 1 eaders. . . are no
longer content to stand by helplessly while their homelands'
economies are managed, or mismanaged, by Moscow planners -for
the benefit of the Russian Republic." CRef. 5: p. 1603
Issues of financial assistance and allocation of
national money have inescapable ethnic and racial
connotations in the Soviet Union. Financing the
military/industrial complex, and the heavy price to maintain
the Soviet Union's foreign policy is a burden to the Soviet
citizens. And it seems to cost some more than otners.
Several sources have noted the rising episodes, (i.e.,
violence) relating to demands for more local control of the
economy, ranging from Lithuania to Georgia to Armenia and
even to those ungrateful Central Asian republics. The
indications are that the non—Russians =>\.\i\er most from the
Soviet economic imbalances.
To appease a growing non—Russian population, should the
central authorities decide to allocate more funds to their
regional development, there will be less money for other
regions (leading to increased inter-regional rivalry) or,
less likely, less money spent on the military. If this
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money is diverted from the military and various foreign
policy objectives, Soviet ethnic problems will have a direct
impact on -foreign policy.
A subset of the guns-versus-butter impasse is the
difficulty of having a growing labor pool in an ars-a where
there is no industry, further complicated by the declining
number of Europeans available for militarv service.
Attempts to resolve this problem can have significant
impacts on Soviet foreign policy. First, if the length of
military service is extended, there will be fewer workers in
the labor force. Another alternative is to allow more
Central Asians into the military mainstream. This will not
only have a trickle—back effect on the economy, but will, as
discussed above, possibly result in a less efficient
military. As is indicated in the next section en power,




An assumption underlying this paper is that a strong
domestic base is important to successful foreign policy. It
is not tnat the domestic base must supoort policy, but that
it does not withdraw vital resources or divert substantial
central political attention from it. To retain their primus
inter pares status as they dip below the numerical
population majority, the Russians must somehow find a means

of maintaining their power. Ethnicity as a social
political force is on the rise. "Pali tici sation c-t-
ethmcity is thus a dialectical process that preserves
ethnic groups by emphasizing their singularity and yet also
engineers and lubricates their modernization by transforming
them into political conflict groups for the modern political
arena. . . " CRef . 35: p. 33
Rasma Kar kl ins noted that the "question of power is at
the core of nationality relations in the Soviet Union."
CRef. 36: p. 701 The distribution of power between the
center and the periphery, the Europeans and non—Europeans
.
is skewed to the center's advantage, allowing it, at
present, to maintain power over the whole.
Contestants for political power, those who design and
implement Soviet foreign policy, can use domestic issues to
strengthen their positions. While at present there are only
a few powerful non-Europeans in any policy making position
(Seidar Alirza ogly Aliyev, the First Deputy Premier from
the Muslim Republic of Azerbaijan, being a notable
exception), it is possible that, as their numbers grow,
non—Europeans can have more impact on domestic issues and
thus more input into aspects of foreign policy.
A primary means of exercising power is through control
of the military. As noted in Chapter Four, the Soviet
military is dominated by ethnic Russians. It would seem that
this dominance would be very slow to shift, despite the
63

demographic changes underway. The Soviet military officer
class is a tight society, generally closed to
non—Europeans. The USSR is a superpower because it is a
strong military power. The primary drive and impetus behind
that power are the Russians. From this power comes the
primary means to af-fect Soviet -foreign policy outside of
sitting on the Central Committee.
D. THE MILITARY
The Soviet military is a means of implementing foreign
policy. It, its efficiency is in any way lessened, then its-
ability to successfully pursue national objectives as an
instrument of foreign policy could be somewhat hampered.
This seems to be particularly true with respect to the use
of Muslim troops in foreign, notably Muslim, countries.
The lessons of the Afghanistan experience are difficult to
judge because o-f the lack of consistent information.
Nevertheless, the available evidence indicates certain
problems with Muslims bartering Soviet military equipment
and supplies, defections to the Afghan side, and refusals
to fire on fellow Muslims. At the very least, the
experience of Soviet Muslims in Afghanistan has almost
certainly heightened their awareness of both the outside
world and the Soviet leadership's willingness to suppress
other Muslim peoples. CRef. 37: p. 3273
The Soviets Are a very historically conscious nation.
Their history is essentially the history of Russia through
official Communist filters. Lessons from the past are
applied to the present, whether or not appropriate in
context. When World War II broke out, the national buffer
states proved to be the weakest link in the Soviet system.
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Even be+ore the war, the Soviets were concerned abet t tne
loyalty of their ethnic minority groups. Nora Belaff
relates that after the MqI ctav-Ri bbentrcp Pact was signed in
1939 many Poles serving in the Soviet Army were shot.
"Stalin must have known that once he had agreed with Hitler
on another parti tion a-f Poland he could hardly count on the
loyalty of Polish soldiers when the Red Army was needed to
police the Soviet share of their country."
CRef. 38: p. 413 While Chernenko is not Stalin, it is
likely that the central authorities will avoid at all costs
using ethnic minorities against their own people, ar in-
actions in strategically vi tal areas.
In the years to come, the demographic shifts presently
underway could seriously affect the implementation of Soviet
foreign policies through military power. As the numbers of
Europeans in the nation decline, the Soviet leaders -f^.c&
increasing problems in recruiting a military they feel they
can both trust and find efficient. These military manpower
dimensions are not now a serious problem for the USSR.
Whether they will be in the future is problematical. But,
given the Soviet propensity to manage rather than solve
their problems, it would seem that long term effects on the
Soviet militarv could hamper the attainment of foreign
policy goals. As a military superpower, anything adversely
affecting the military has the potential to adversely affect
that power. How much effect the demographic changes will

have on the military be-fore the central authorities are
-forced to resolve it is a problem -for the future.
E. EXPORTS
The exportation o-f communist ideas affecting nationality
and ethnic issues highlight inconsistencies in the Soviet
system. The Soviet Union claims that its nati cnal i t : e
5
problem has been solved and "o-f-fers itself as a moaei for
multi—ethnic societies of the developing world."
CRef. 1: p. 11 Its solution was administrative division of
the country according to nationality. "Now Moscow pushes
hard for the assimilation of all Soviet nationalities with
the Russians, and for eventually erasing internal
nationality boundary lines. The leaders at the same time
promote the contrary idea abroad—of the need iar separation
or segregation into nationality units." CRef. 39: p. viil
These inconsistencies in nationalist policies may prove
difficult for the USSR in the years to come.
Yet, as Farmer notes, "the evidence is overwhelming that
the CPSU leadership has for the last decade and a half faced
a national and ethnic challenge of grave and growing
proportions." CRef. 1: p. i 1 He further argues that Soviet
success in managing its multinational state is reflected
primarily in its having so far prevented a successful
secessionary move, violent or otherwise, on the part of any
of its constituent republics. This measure of the
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successful management of a multi—ethnic federation, however,
should not prematurely be regarded as a solution, because it
sidesteps the question of whether the Soviet leadership will
be able to deal successfully with the tensions that a.rs at
the root of the problem. CRef. 1: pp. 2—33
Nationalism o-f many Soviet minorities is aimed a.i the
preservation of their cultures, and specifically against
being assimilated or Russified. "The issue has been less one
of the territorial extent and form of Soviet government,
than of specific regime policies in the cultural sphere and
in the selection, promotion and distribution ar elites."
CRef. Is p. 73 Noting that the USSR espouses national
independence for Third World states, and that the Eastern
European empire has at least formal sovereignty, some
nationalists may well ask, if them, why not my republic?
Crisostomo reports that since the 1950 's the Soviets
have used their own Muslims "extensively to further
cultural, economic and diplomatic relations with third world
countries, particularly those with large Muslim
populations." CRef. 37: p. 3303 Muslims, well screened for
loyalty to the regime, make up a large percentage of the
staff in Soviet embassies and diplomatic missions in various
Islamic countries. CRef. 37: p. 3303 She further explains
that "Soviet leaders often extol the relatively rapid social
and economic development of Soviet Muslim republics and
promote them as models for third world development."
CRef. 37: p. 3303
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Various information and exchange programs aimed at
Middle East are very "Tur kocentri c " . According tj Asrael
,
these programs have a "strong emphasis on the vitality and
richness of Soviet Muslims political, economic and cultural
life and on the 'lessons' that other Muslims can draw from
the Soviet Turkic experience." LRef. 40: p. 1473
The Soviets attempt to cultivate the foreign kinsmen of
most of their own nationalities. Their primary goals sesm
to be to mitigate any militancy that these people may use in
lobbying -far their relatives in the USSR, to reduce
anti—Soviet sentiments and to better trade relations with
these people's new countries. The various nationalities o-f
the USSR serve as tools in the varied panoply of Soviet
foreign policy.
Yet, despite the Soviet quest for international
influence, by most accounts it has not been dramatically
successful. While some countries have welcomed Soviet
assistance, and are impressed by what the Soviet Union has
been able to accomplish, "most third world countries remain
wary a-f- Soviet motives, and few have adopted the Soviet
economic development model." CRef. 37: p. 3403
Another aspect of the exportation of the Soviet
nationality ideology is the highlighting of internal and




Externally, the Soviet leadership touts the religious
-freedom of its Muslims. supports various national
liberation movements in developing countries, and
maintains that Islam and communism can find common
ground. Internally, Soviet officials condemn religious
practice, try to diffuse nationalist tendencies of the
Muslim population, and play down the religious aspects of
external events like the Iranian revolution. Because of
this paradoxical behavior, Soviet leaders risk
intensifying the national consciousness of their own
Muslim people. CRef. 37: p. 34Gj
Finally, following the line of thought a-f the above
quotation, Neil Hyams discussed the Soviet manner of
encouraging selected nationalisms for foreign palicv
reasons, but notes that this "must seem particularly cynical
to many non-Russians." CRef. 41: p. 1973
F. DISCUSSION
Current Soviet foreign policy is pragmatic,
survi val —ori ented and not easily influenced by domestic
issues. Neither internal nor external pressures arising
from Soviet ethnic and national problems are likely to
precipitate major changes in Soviet foreign policy.
However, as Crisostomo comments, ethnic and demographic
problems "will continue to exacerbate other problems the
Soviet leadership faces, especially in its attempts to gain
influence in the third world." CRef. 37: p. 3403 Further,
over the long range, any lessening of efficiency of the
Soviet military may cause some impact on the implementation
of Soviet foreign policy. Another aspect of problems caused
by Soviet demographic and ethnic difficulties is that they
may withdraw vital resources or divert attention from
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established policy goals in political attempts to o 3.
resolve or repress nationality problems. Underlying all is
the realisation that the language o-f Soviet foreign policy
is not necessarily the reality. What they say may nor be




This thesis examined Soviet ethnic and national problems
resulting -from the gradual demographic shifts presently
underway. It has considered the impact o-f the shift -from a
Russian majority in a Russian dominated society, to the
Russians becoming only one large minority group among many.
As demographic trends take several generations to achieve
significant results, the change in the Soviet ethnic balance
will be a gradual process, so oare must be taken not to
exagerate its pace or effects. This aside, the tensions
that will increasingly strain the Soviet system as a result
of the demographic changes present complex problems with
which the new Kremlin leadership must deal.
Soviet leaders appear stymied. They are unsure of how
to deal with such a potentially explosive problem. The
Soviet tendency to manage rather than resolve problems will
only worsen the long term effect. Further complicating any
solution is the dilemma of solving a problem which
officially does not exist. Azrael concludes that Brezhnev's
claim that the "historical nationality problem" had
definitely been solved was "certainly premature and may turn
out to have been rashly overconfident." CRef. 40: p. 1391
As the weight of the population shifts, so does the
potential for power. After six decades of Communist rule,
the ethnic minorities of the Soviet Union are operating from
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a stronger position, especially in terms of modern i :a r.i on
.
Many groups are educated, some are urban and all are
increasingly politically mobile. While no single factor can
explain Soviet -foreign policy, ethnic or national input will
probably have increasing impact througn domestic constraints
on foreign policy.
The Soviet Union, despite its awesome military power, is
attempting to both deal with and channel nationalistic
forces. Meyer concludes that the Soviets "are attempting to
survive an era o-f intense nationalism with an empire whose
roots lie deep in the nineteenth century.'
CRef. 5: p. 1661 Could it be that today there is yet
another sweeping historical movement, similar to chose
preceedinq the revolutions of 1843? Perhaps the rise in
Soviet nationalism has its roots not only in history,
ethnicity and demographic changes, but in an etnnonat i onal
movement such as that suggested by Croan. The Russian goal
of building the Soviet Man has so far failed. Possibly by
emphasizing national differences, the Soviets unknowingly
triggered somewhat dormant nationalism.
As Wesson wrote some years ago, the national problem ir is
held no problem in the Soviet Union; the most forbidden of
all subjects is that of the real relation between
nationalities." CRef. 2: p. 431 1 This creates a source of
weakness, but the seriousness of the issue is unknown. A
November 1968 quote from an article in "Pravda" may give a
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tclue to Soviet concern. "The national question is cr-a of
the most complicated and acute questions of social
development. It has taken on special acuteness in the
contemporary era, the era o-F struggle of socialism and
capitalism..." CRef. 2: p. 433 1
Key to the issue of nationalism is that the various
Communist regimes have -failed to alter the subjective
orientation of minority nationalities they rule;
inequalities among ethnic or linguistic groups remain
politically volatile less because of what people have than
because of how they feel as citizens of a particular
Communist party state dominated bv another nationality."!
CRef. 42: p. 2733 These inequalities remain important. A
Polish sociologist wrote that the party cannot disassociate
itself from any social strains caused by inequalities in the
system. She notes that, in the final analysis, "it all
comes down to the question (of) the legitimacy of the
existing system." CRef. 42: p. 275j This is further
expanded when she comments that
With a centralized system of decision-making and
supervision of (policy execution) ... any , even small,
deterioration of living standards brings into sharp relief
the problem of methods of leader recruitment. Doubt is
cast on the leaders' legitimacy and the question is
revived as to whose interests are really represented by
people in authority. CRef. 42: p. 275J
This may be made even more difficult as the demographic
changes become more apparent. iThe Russian power elite will
be forced either to share some of that power in the future.
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or to became even more elitist and somehow -find the power to
maintain that status.l The internal pressures and problems
could strengthen the Soviet regime's determination to retain
its East European empire; thus, they will be more likely to
crsick down on any East European deviations, and any overflow
into Soviet dominions.
In the long run, perhaps the only way the USSR can
maintain its current growth rates, standard of living and
dominance ai the military/industrial complex is by
increasing the already substantial technology transfers from
the West. Importing foreign workers may also help alleviate
the trained, urban labor shortfalls. Both of these fixes
have the potential for dramatic impact on Soviet foreign
policy, and could also further constrain the Soviet
economy. Yet even with this, Soviet industrial growth could
decline. The regime could find it difficult to satisfy both
their military/industrial complex, their goals of
international power and recognition, and the rising
expectations of their people. The declining fertility for
much of the Soviet Union implies minimal population growth
while Soviet planners have counted on long—run moderate
increases. With the marked regional differences, attention
is bound to be accorded to these disparities in attempts to
either restrain or encourage fertility.
If pressures on the Soviet system become intense enough,
they could seek An outlet to divert their peoples'
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attention, Azrael concludes that the regime may be tempted
to dissipate pressures "by initiating pol i tical—mi 1 i tary
confrontations of a sort that could activate an otherwise
recessive or inoperative Soviet patriotism."
CRef. 20: p. 380 J By creating a devil to divert the people
some time may be bought.
As noted, foreign policy is probably somewhat remote
from direct influence by most members of the Soviet
population. Vet foreign policy is tempered and somewhat
constrained by Soviet ethnic problems. Their short term
effects seem to have little impact on Soviet foreign policy
and on forecasts for the future. For the Soviet Union, a
major problem o-f the coming decades will be how their
leadership attempts to solve, or at least adapt to Soviet
demographic changes. They must either reconcile the various
nationalities and bring them into more active participation
in the Soviet system, or repress their nationalistic
endeavors. Either of these will have some impact on the
basic integrity of the Soviet system, and will certainly
affect the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. The
nationality problem may not be intrinsically momentous, but
it is crucial for its potentially exacerbating effects on
Soviet foreign policy. ULf the Soviets Are forced to deal
with their nationality problems, the resolution, or even
makeshift solutions, may withdraw vital resources from other
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sectors of the country or divert political attention f
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